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Book
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Soul of Classical American Philosophy: The Ethical and Spiritual Insights of
William James, Josiah Royce, and Charles Sanders Peirce. By Richard
P. Mullin. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007. HC $68.50. PB $28.95 |
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Richard
Mullin describes this book as having two purposes: first, to make the key ideas
of James, Royce, and Peirce accessible to readers who are not specialists in
classical American philosophy or philosophy in general, and second, to
illuminate the merits of their ideas as they apply to thought and to life.
When it comes to these goals, I believe that Mullin is, on the whole,
successful. At the same time, however, I believe that the shortcomings of this
book are significant enough to warrant elaboration in this review. I will
begin with these, and end by focusing on the aspects of this book deserving of
celebration.
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In
the first line of the text, Mullin stipulates that "in describing the soul of
American philosophy," he is focusing on the thought of James, Royce, and Peirce
as they "dealt with issues that would be treated under the name of soul in traditional philosophy." He
enumerates these issues as "the search for truth; the meaning of whatever we
call our 'self,' especially in relation to our bodily existence; free will;
moral values; community, and our relationship with the Transcendent" (xi). The
decision to discuss the thought of James, Royce, and Peirce in this regard is
certainly sound, but the absence of John Dewey in this conversation is
immediately glaring. Mullin is aware of this, asserting that despite his
emphasis, he does not deny Dewey's importance. He then gives a paragraph
summation of Dewey's philosophical vision, concluding that, "John Dewey stands
out among the most important classical pragmatists and his work receives adequate
and deserved attention" (xiv). Although Mullin is to be credited for
acknowledging Dewey's importance, his case for not treating Dewey at any length
is rather unsatisfying. One might make the same remark about James or Peirce;
each stands out among the most important classical pragmatists and the work of
each receives adequate and deserved attention. So why engage them in the
present work, but not Dewey?
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The
answer cannot be that Dewey says nothing or little about that which Mullin
describes as falling under the name of soul.
Dewey engages each of these issues within his cavernous corpus, some topics
taking up residence at the heart of several books. I suspect that the
motivation for Mullin's exclusion of Dewey is intimated in the "Personal Note"
marking the end of the Introduction, in which Mullin tells of his giving a
series of lectures at the University of Trnava, a state university in Slovakia
with a Catholic orientation: "The administrators were surprised to learn that
American pragmatism is compatible with Christianity. I told them that this
misunderstanding prevails among Americans as well. I suggested to my hosts
that the work of James, Royce, and Peirce, coming from outside the Catholic
tradition, could serve to revitalize Catholic philosophy in a way analogous to
the way the works of Aristotle did in the thirteenth century" (xv). It seems
that Mullin excludes Dewey because unlike James, Royce, and Peirce, Dewey
overtly spurns organized religion. If this is the case, Mullin should state so
explicitly; otherwise, it seems implied that Dewey has little regard for the
matters discussed in this book or that the scholarship has exhausted all to be
said of these aspects of Dewey's thought. Either implication is gravely
misleading, especially in a text intended for newcomers to the classical
American tradition.
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Another
choice that arouses curiosity is that of treating Peirce after James and Royce,
when Peirce is widely considered the founder of American pragmatism and clearly
influences the thought of James and Royce. Mullin acknowledges the
counterintuitive quality of the order in which he handles these figures, but
defends his decision by pointing out that Peirce's national and international
influence emerged later than that of James and Royce (120). While this may be
so, it would seem more helpful to the reader new to the classical American
tradition to meet these authors in biographical order. This book centers on
the thought of these philosophers, after all, not on their public reputations.
The treatments of James and Royce would have been richer if they had followed
an account of Peirce, highlighting those tenets of his thought which each
inherited and resisted. Moreover, the anticipatory groundwork Mullin would
have laid in his discussion of Peirce would have helped to fill out a section
of the book that feels fragmentary, especially when compared to the other two.
While Mullin devotes sixty pages to James and forty-eight to Royce, he offers
just twenty-nine on Peirce, including a chapter on the human person that Mullin
himself describes as bringing "nothing new to the table" (158). Another
approach would be to omit the discussion of Peirce altogether, in favor of
deepening the discussions of James and Royce. Granted, if this were done, the
book could not be cast as a general introduction to classical American
philosophy, but would instead become a close examination of the philosophical
dialogue between James and Royce, a juxtaposition that Mullin calls "one of the
most fascinating comparisons and contrasts in philosophy" (67). Such a study
would be a welcome addition to the literature, and finds its rudiments in
Mullin's work. |
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This
book is indeed at its most fascinating when navigating the thick territories of
James and Royce. Mullin's expositions of James on free will and spirituality
would be of great service to anyone struggling to comprehend these dimensions
of his thought. More impressive, though, is the clarity of Mullin's accounts
of Royce's idealism and conception of the self. Here, Mullin is forced to
explicate notoriously dense prose from The
World and the Individual, and does so with elegance and élan. One
heuristic strategy that Mullin employs is to contrast the positions of
classical American pragmatists with those of philosophers who came before them.
This is executed most effectively in the first two chapters dedicated to James
and the first two chapters dedicated to Royce, very appropriate places,
incidentally, for such comparisons to take place. With respect to the former,
Mullin contrasts James's radical empiricism with British empiricism, and
James's conception of the mind/body relation with those of a variety of ancient
Greek and medieval thinkers. With respect to the latter, Mullin contrasts
Royce's notion of an idea with those notions found in British empiricism, and
Royce's notion of the self with those of a gamut of philosophers including
Aquinas, Hume, and Hegel. These comparisons are all too brief but likely still
helpful to the reader with a basic philosophical background. These portions
could be particularly useful in survey courses in American philosophy at both
undergraduate and graduate levels. |
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Thus, despite my
reservations about this book, it is fair to say that Mullin makes good on his
goal of rendering classical American pragmatism more accessible. Further,
Mullin also succeeds in demonstrating the good that can come to our lives from
a "deep drink from the spring of classical American pragmatism" (xv). For
Mullin, the tie binding James, Royce, and Peirce is the view that belief in,
and devotion to, the soul (as Mullin
describes it) enriches the lives of individuals and communities alike. If this
is the case, those unfamiliar with classical American philosophy have
compelling impetus to seek the introduction Mullin provides.
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Mathew A. Foust
Department of Philosophy
University of Oregon
mfoust@uoregon.edu |
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